GSTP tariff reduction and its effects on South-South trade in manufactures by Linnemann, H. & Verbruggen, H.
SERIE RESEARCH mEmORMIDn 
GSTP TARIFF REDUCTION AND ITS EFFECTS 
ON SOUTH-SOUTH TRADE IN MANUFACTURES 
H. Liimemaim 
H. Verbruggen 
Researchmemorandum 1988-44 oktober 1988 
f' 
I 
VRIJE UNIVERSITEIT 
FACULTEIT DER ECONOMISCHE WETENSCHAPPEN 
EN ECONOMETRIE 
A M S T E R D A M 

GSTP TARIFF REDUCTION AND ITS EFFECTS 
ON SOUTH-SOUTH TRADE IN MANUFACTURES 
Hans Linnemann and Harmen Verbruggen* 
IDPAD 
New Delhi/The Hague 
Economie and Social Institute 
Free University 
P.O. Box 7161 
1007 MC Amsterdam October 1988 
This study forms part of the research project Prospects for Trade in 
Manufactures Among Developing Countries. The research project is 
financed by the Indo-Dutch Programme on Alternatives in Development 
(IDPAD), New Delhi/The Hague. 
* The authors are indebted to Jan Bade for computational assistance 
and substantive comments. 

GSTP Tariff Reduction and lts Effects on South-South Trade in 
Manufactures 
CONTENTS PAGE 
1. Introduction 1 
2. Estimating the impact of TCMs on the level of trade 2 
3. The gravity equation with tariff levels 7 
4. The effects of lower tariff levels on the volume of trade 15 
5. Summary and conclusions 28 
References 31 
ABSTRACT 
Using a gravity model with the import tariff on manufactures as an 
explanatory variable at the import side as well as 'at the export side, 
the impact of tariffs on trade in manufactures is analyzed for a sample 
of 39 LDC importers. Next, the consequences of a GSTP for manufactures 
are estimated by lowering for intra-LDC trade the initial LDC import 
tariffs. The short-term effects on South-South trade in manufactures 
are found to be relatively modest only, and the long-term effects 
considerably larger. A linear tariff cut by some 10 to 20 percent has a 
limited trade-expanding effect, and a more substantial lowering would 
be called for to make the laborious GSTP negotiating processes pay off. 
In the approach foliowed here, the extent of trade diversion from DC 
suppliers to LDC suppliers does not strongly affect South-South trade 
expansion. 

1. Introduction 
Af ter many years of discussions and negotiations, an "Agreement on a 
Global System of Trade Preferences (GSTP) among Developing Countries" 
was concluded among 48 member-countries of the Group of 77 on 13 April 
1988 at Belgrade, Yugoslavia. Virtually all major developing countries, 
in terms of their international trade volume, are signatories of the 
Agreement - with the exception of China (willing to enter, but not a 
member of the Group of 77), Hong Kong, Taiwan, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. 
Ratification by 15 signatories will bring the Agreement into force. 
A principal element of the Agreement is the mutual reduction of all 
Trade Control Measures (TCMs) affecting trade between the member-
countries. Enhancing mutual trade in manufactured products is often 
seen as being of particular importance, in view of such factors as (a) 
the long-term market prospects for manufactures as compared to those 
for primary commodities, (b) the economies of scale to be gained in 
manufacturing output, rather than in primary production, (c) the 
development and transfer of technology and skills in the manufacturing 
sector, and (d) the strong dependence of most developing countries thus 
far on manufactured products supplied by the industrialized countries. 
This paper tries to estimate the impact of a GSTP on the level of trade 
in manufactures between the countries of the South. In doing so, it is 
assumed that all countries of the South (at least all those included in 
the sample of developing countries used in this paper) will become 
member-countries of the GSTP; China, however, is not (yet) considered 
to be a GSTP-member. Also, possible special and preferential measures 
in favour of the least-developed member-countries are not taken into 
account; although such measures are envisaged in principle under the 
Agreement, the present analysis deals with all developing countries on 
an equal footing. 
In analysing the trade-stimulating impact on South-South trade of a 
lowering of TCMs between developing countries, the first step is to 
determine to what extent existing TCMs actually restrain mutual trade. 
The approach adopted here is discussed in section 2 of the paper; 
tariff levels are taken to be representative of the total level of 
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protection through TCMs, and the gravity equation is introduced as the 
tooi to be used in assessing the trade-restraining effect of these 
tariffs. Section 3 describes the data set and the estimation procedure 
foliowed in determining the parameter values of the gravity equation 
containing tariff levels. The regression results obtained are used in 
section 4 to simulate the effects of a (preferential) lowering of the 
initial tariff levels of the countries of the South, for a 20 or 50 
percent linear tariff reduction. The difficult issue of trade creation 
versus trade diversion is dealt with by distinguishing between the two 
extreme cases of no trade diversion at all and maximum trade diversion 
from industrial-country imports to imports from the South. Also, a 
distinction is made between short-term and long-term effects. Section 5 
gives a summary and conclusions. 
All this refers to total trade in manufactures, for the countries 
included in the sample. Due to resource contraints, an intended 
application at a lower level of product aggregation (differentiating 
between, say, four or five main product groups) could not be realized 
as yet. 
2- Estimating the impact of TCMs on the level of trade 
Since the introduction of statistical techniques in applied economie 
analysis in the 1930s, the area of international trade relations has 
been one of the fields most intensively studied with the help of 
econometrie methods. There is, e.g.. a vast literature analyzing 
relationships involving prices and quantities of goods traded 
internationally, both at the level of individual commodities and at the 
level of aggregates such as total imports and exports. Empirical 
studies have stimulated further theoretical and methodological work, 
an(i vice versa. 
Analysis of the impact of TCMs forms part of this body of knowledge. 
Empirical analysis of TCMs has focussed in particular on the effects of 
import tariffs, including other TCMs that can be translated in terms of 
tariff charges. The impact of those TCMs that cannot readily be 
expressed in a tariff equivalent is often much more difficult to assess 
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empirically1 - except in such straightforward cases as, e.g., outright 
prohibition of exports or imports. Due to the wide array of TCMs other 
than tariff charges (see Verbruggen, 1988), the uncertainty about the 
extent or degree of their actual application, and occasionally indeed 
the near-ignorance about the kind of effects to be expected from their 
use, tariff levels may perforce have to be used as a pars pro toto or 
even as indicative of the level of NTBs as well. The present study also 
will adhere to this approach; thus, tariff levels are taken to be 
indicative of the overall intensity of a country's TCMs, and a lowering 
of these levels is assumed to lead to an increase in trade as if import 
tariffs were the only TCM restricting imports. In the words of Erzan, 
Laird and Yeats (1986, p. 3), this approach "implies that any non-
tariff measures facing these imports will be relaxed to an extent that 
allows the full trade effects of the tariff [lowering] to be achieved. 
A further related assumption is that other barriers to expanding 
imports, such as balance-of-payment or currency constraints, are also 
relaxed". 
Taking the tariff levels as the point of departure for an analysis of 
the impact of trade impediments on the level of foreign trade, the 
question arises what methodology to use in assessing this impact. In 
earlier -studies of trade flow3~~ as~ Tëlited" Tö tariff structure, 
preferential trading arrangements, customs unions, and the like, a 
variety of approaches has been foliowed. According to Karsenty and 
Laird (1986), four main approaches may be distinguished: 
(a) constant market share analysis, for specific products or in the 
aggregate; 
(b) partial equilibrium studies, based on import demand functions for 
specific disaggregated products; 
(c) gravity models, used to determine aggregate trade flows; 
(d) computable general equilibriumn models for (highly) aggregated 
products and industries. 
Each of the four approaches has its stronger and weaker points. From a 
theoretical point of view, the latter approach is the most ambitious 
and satisfactory one; it is also the most exacting one in terms of the 
See e.g. Deardorff and Stern (1985). 
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data, time, and effort involved. Apart from this, the choice of 
method will be influenced by the particulars of the problem on hand, 
and possibly by the availability of data. 
In this paper, a gravity model will be used to estimate the impact of 
tariffs on the level of trade. Reasons for this choice were (a) the 
need to deal with total trade in manufactures (in particular between 
developing countries), thus necessitating a high level of aggregation 
over products, and (b) the availability of tariff (and NTB) data for 
one 'year' only, prompting a cross-section analysis over countries. The 
gains of using this convenient approach are obtained at a price, 
however; in its usual formulation, the gravity model is not 
convincingly based on received theory and "its use for policy is 
severely hampered by its "unidentified" properties". * Because of its 
present use in a comparative-staties context, these drawbacks of the 
gravity equation may not be too serious; further discussion of this 
issue follows below. It should be noted here already that the use of 
the gravity model implies that direct trade effects only will be 
quantified; indirect effects via a trade-growth relationship are not 
taken into account in this setting. 
The--gravity equation- describes the trade--ftovr between exporting and 
importing country as resulting from the combined effect of three sets 
of factors: 
(a) variables representing the supply side or export potential, 
(b) variables representing the demand side or import potential, and 
(c) variables affecting the intensity of trade between the two 
(potential) trade partners. 
As the present analysis focusses - on the impact of TGMs on trade in 
manufactures, the following have been selected as explanatory variables 
in the gravity equation: 
(1) the value added of the manufacturing sector in the exporting 
See e.g. Whalley (1985) and Srinivasan and Whalley (1986). 
Anderson (1979), p. 106. Trade theory on which to base the 
gravity equation is discussed also in Bergstrand (1985) and in 
Helpman and Krugman (1985). Merkies and Van der Meer (1988) 
discuss the relation between the gravity model and the extended 
Armington model. 
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country, representing the supply potential; 
(2) the value of GNP of the importing country, representing demand 
potential; 
(3) and (4) population size of the exporting and the importing 
country, respectively. Note that population size is to be seen 
here as a proxy for the economies of scale in manufacturing 
production that can be realized in the home market; the larger the 
population size is, the lower the need to realize economies of 
scale through export production (for the exporting country), and 
the greater the chances of realizing in domestic production the 
required economies of scale (for the importing country); 
(5) for the importing country, the level of TCMs affecting its imports 
of manufactured products. Obviously, a higher level of TCMs may be 
expected to lead to a lower level of manufactured imports. Some 
reflection on the effects of these 'artificial' trade impediments, 
however, makes us aware of an additional consequence: a high level 
of TCMs not only reduces imports, but increases at the same time 
the domestic-market orientation of production and hence (most 
probably) reduces exports. This line of reasoning induced the 
incorporation of an additional variable: 
(6) for the exporting country, the level of TCMs affecting its imports 
of manufactured"p^roducts". Héncé, the variable indicating the level 
of TCMs - which is in this study in fact the level of import 
tariffs, as a pars pro toto - appears twice in the gravity 
equation, both at the import side and at the export side. In terms 
of the three sets of trade-determining factors referred to above, 
the TCM variable at the export side is to be seen as belonging to 
set (a), i.e. as a factor reducing a country's export potential. 
While a lowering of the level of TCMs is likely to raise the level 
of imports in the short run already, the corresponding effects at 
the export side may take a much longer time to materialize as they 
require a change in market orientation and probably even a certain 
restructuring of manufacturing production; 
(7) the geographical distance between the trade partners, as 
indicative of the level of transport costs, ease of business 
communication, familiarity with market conditions, and the like. 
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Summarizing, the impact of TCMs on the level of trade in manufactures 
will be estimated using a gravity equation of the below structure: 
X?. - f (V?, N., T?, Y., N., Tm, D..) 
ij o- i i 3 J J iJ 
with 
X - value of the (bilateral) trade flow of manufactures 
- value added of the manufacturing sector 
Y - GNP 
N - population size 
e m e m 
T ,T - level of import tariffs (initially and ultimately T - T ; 
their 'time path' may be different, however) 
D - geographical distance 
i - subscript exporting country 
j » subscript importing country. 
Other explanatory variables might have been added, in particular dummy 
variables indicating the existence or not of a common border, of a 
common language, of preferential trade arrangements, etc. However, 
earlier studies using a gravity-model approach have shown such factors 
to be of limited importance only. Omitting them (to the extent that 
they would actually exist in the sample of trade flows on which the 
empirical study will be based) may somewhat reduce the overall level of 
'explanation' of the trade flows observed, but will not introducé a 
bias in the estimated parameter values. 
Once a set of reliable estimates of the parameter values of the gravity 
equation is obtained, the next step is to lower the level of import 
tariffs Tm for those trade flows that originate in LDCs, in order to 
assess the potential trade-stimulating consequences of preferential 
trade between LDCs. The short-run or initial effect will originate at 
the import side: an LDC will import more from other LDCs when for 
South-South trade the artificial trade impediments in the form of 
tariffs have been lowered. At the same time, LDCs will export more to 
LDCs. A complicating factor in this exercise in comparative staties is 
that both trade creation and trade diversion will occur, as import 
tariffs on manufactured goods originating from DCs are. not lowered. 
These two effects cannot be properly distinguished in the present 
approach; a not altogether satisfactory but yet acceptable solution for 
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this problem is discussed in section 4. 
In addition to the short-run effect on South-South trade of a lower 
price on the domestic market of manufactures imported from LDCs, there 
is the medium- to long-term effect of lower protection on the market 
orientation and structure of the domestic manufacturing sector. 
Although by definition T e - Tm, it takes time before a change in T m is 
fully reflected in a change in Te, and hence the ultimate effect of a 
lower T e is studied separately. The increased openness of the South to 
world trade resulting from a lowering of T m is assumed to lead in due 
time to an equal lowering of Te, thus erihancing its export potential of 
manufactured products. The immediate and the long-run effects on South-
South trade of a lowering of TCMs for intra-South trade flows are both 
analyzed and discussed in section 4. Before that, the estimation of the 
gravity equation and the underlying data set have to be dealt with, in 
section 3. 
3. The gravitv eauation with tariff levels 
A basic requirement for any attempt to establish empirically the extent 
to which trade between LBGs~~rs hampered by^TCMs Is," óbviöusly, the 
availability of data on such trade impediments. Even if the analysis is 
limited to import tariffs as the conceptually and statistically 
clearest f orm of TCMs - as is the case in the present study -, it is 
not easy to collect and process the primary data for a large number of 
LDCs. Fortunately, use could be made of the valuable set of data being 
build-up in the Trade Information System of UNCTAD.1 
However, not all importing developing countries included in our sample 
are covered by this system as yet. For the developing countries not 
covered in the system, data on tariffs have been estimated by making 
use of an established relationship between, on the one hand, nominal 
tariff protection of the manufacturing sector, and per capita GNP, 
population size and export orientation on the other hand; see 
For particulars on the Trade Information System and its data, see 
Verbruggen (1988). 
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Verbruggen (1988). It should be noted that for all importing developing 
countries the tariff-level variable has been measured as the 
unweighted, rather than the import-weighted, average ad valorem import 
tariff for the total manufacturing sector, as the former average could 
be calculated for a much larger number of sample countries. The tariff 
level variables for the remaining exporting OECD countries are based on 
import-weighted pre-Tokyo Round tariff levels calculated by Corbet 
(1979), Deardorff and Stern (1983) and GATT (1980). 
The use of unweighted tariff averages for the developing countries 
might yield upward-biased estimates vis-a-vis import-weighted tariff 
averages, as one might expect in general that in calculating the 
latter, high tariff rates are given small weights and low tariff rates 
large weights. This bias, however, appears to be not too serious. In a 
sample of 29 developing countries for which both tariff averages could 
be calculated, weighted tariff averages were lower than unweighted 
averages in 14 cases; in the remaining 15 cases, the two tariff 
averages were nearly the same or the weighted version even exceeded the 
unweighted version. 
The trade-impeding impact at the consuming, importing side is indeed 
most adequately "Captured-by nomina! tar±ff~rarte"s\~~ISut~on the producing, 
exporting side, it is of course effective rates of protection that 
matter. Generation of an additional data set on effective rates of 
protection for such a large number of countries is, however, simply out 
of the question. Thus, if the average ad valorem import-tariff rate 
expressed as a percentage of the import price is t, the explanatory 
variable in the regression analysis Tm(-Te) is defined as T m — 1 + . 
100 
In addition to the data on TCMs in general and import tariffs in 
particular, UNCTAD trade flow data on magnetic tape provided the 
detailed figures (at 4- and 5-digit level) on imports of manufactures. 
The most recent year for which the greater part of the required 
information was available, is 1980. 
The commodity class Manufactures as used in this study consists of all 
products belonging to the ISIC Major Division 3: Manufacturing. UN 
statistical manuals provided the link between the ISIC and SITC Rev. 2 
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commodity classifications; see Verbruggen (1988). Import tariffs, when 
available, are given according to the CCCN classification; relating the 
latter accurately to the SITC classification required operations at the 
4- and 5-digit level. Only for a total of 39 LDC importers this 
cumbersome work of building-up a set of reliable data could be 
performed successfully. As countries of origin of the manufactures 
imported by these 39 LDGs, 60 exporters are included in the analysis: 
the same 39 LDCs, plus Syria, China, Poland, and 18 OECD countries. A 
listing of these countries is given in Tables 3 and 5. Data on GNP and 
population size were taken from World Bank (1983), on value added in 
manufacturing from United Nations (various years), on exchange rates 
from IMF (various issues), while geographical distances were calculated 
as .the shortest sea distance between the countries' major ports 
according to United States Defense Mapping Agency (1985) plus an 
estimated hinterland 'distance in case the latter was greater than 100 
nautical miles. 
Based on the data set just described, the bilateral trade flows of a 
trade matrix of (60-1) x 39 = 2301 elements may be regressed on the 
proposed explanatory variables using the gravity equation in its 
logarithmic specification. As 608 (or 26 percent) of the cells of the 
trade matrix-are empty.thi^ raises" the" quest:iön~ of the" chöicè of the 
proper estimation procedure. A Standard OLS procedure can be applied to 
non-zero flows only, but this might lead to biased parameter estimates. 
Well-known alternatives are a Tobit procedure (Amemiya, 1973), a 
"threshold regression model" (Dagenais, 1969), or a "censored 
regression model" (Nelson, 1977). However, as Bikker (1982) has shown, 
much depends on the cause or causes of zero observations for trade 
flows, and depending upon the 'true' cause the alternative procedures 
may be biased as well. Furthermore, minor improvements in explaining 
the smallest trade flows will hardly carry any weight in the final 
results (as will be substantiated below). For the sake of convenience 
it was decided to stick to the OLS procedure; we come back to the issue 
of the zero flows towards the end of this section. 
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Thus, for the remaining 2301 - 608 - 1693 non-zero observations, the 
regression equation is specified as 
In X™. - a-. + a.. In V™ + a„ In N. + a_ In T? + a, In Y. + a c In N. + i j 0 1 i 2 i 3 1 4 j 5 j 
+ a, In T? + a., In D. . 6 J 7 i j 
with 
XT, - value of trade in manufactures from country i to country j, in 
1,000 US dollars 
V? — value added in manufacturing in country i, in million US dollars 
N. - population size of country i, in 1,000 inhabitants 
Y. - GNP in country j, in million US dollars 
N. - population size of country j, in 1,000 inhabitants 
6 m T. — T. - (1 + t./100) _ average ad valorem import tariff 
of country i, expressed as a factor by which import prices are 
raised 
D. . - geographical distance between countries i and j", in nautical 
miles. 
Direct estimation of the regression coefficients of the gravity 
equation with tariff variables meets with a problem, however. As has 
been shown in Verbruggen (1988), tariff levels are related to 
population size. In a cross-section analysis over 45 developing 
countries, Verbruggen found a significant and positive effect of 
population size on the level of nominal protection for the 
manufacturing sector. Thus, the explanatory variables N^ and Te^ will 
be intercorrelated, and likewise the variables N-s and Tmj . Earlier 
studies using the gravity model, e.g. Linnemann (1966), also found 
intercorrelation between GNP and population size. The latter case of 
multicollinearity is in itself not a serious problem in the present 
context, as there is no need to establish the 'true' contribution of 
each of these two explanatory variables separately; with respect to the 
tariff variable, however, it is essential to identify its proper weight 
in the overall explanation of the trade flows in order to assess in 
subsequent simulations the impact of tariff changes. 
To come to grips with this problem, a series of regression analyses has 
been made; the results are reported in Table 1. Straightforward 
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application of OLS leads to the parameter estimates of Case A. The 
estimate of 05 (the coëfficiënt of the population variable of the 
importing country) has the wrong sign. Some explanatory variables show 
indeed strong intercorrelation; see the below correlation coefficients: 
In V? with In N. 0.619 
1 1 
In Y. with In N. 0.699 
J J 
In T? with In N. 0.477 
1 1 
In Tm with In N. 0.592 
J J 
If the tariff variables are omitted from the equation, the results of 
Case B are obtained. The large negative values of c*2 and 05 go hand in 
hand with increased (positive) values of a^ and 04, respectively, as 
compared with Case A. The estimate of 05 has the correct sign now, but 
it represents the combined effect of two (supposedly) negative forces: 
population size and tariff level. On theoretical grounds, it has to be 
assumed that both variables exert a negative influence on the level of 
trade - albeit perhaps only moderately so with respect to population. 
In Cases C and D, the Case B estimate of a^ is kept constant, while in 
Case C also 05 is given a pre-assigned value. On the basis of the 
results obtained in numerous earlier analyses using the gravity 
equation, a value of -0.05 was chosen for 05. As the results for Case C 
show, a 'reasonable' estimate for ag is obtained. A comparable result 
is obtained in Case D, where the latter coëfficiënt is fixed beforehand 
(as well as a^) and a 'reasonable' estimate for «5 is found. 
Scrutiny of the residuals of the above-mentioned regressions revealed 
that the largest deviations of the regression plane frequently occur 
when one of the oil-exporting countries is the exporter. Apparently, as 
exporters of manufactures the large oil producers do not fit too well 
into the 'normal' pattern. As an additional exercise, a regression was 
run on the data set excluding the manufactured exports originating from 
the five OPEC members having a very high share (of about 90 percent or 
more) of petroleum in their export package. Excluded were the exports 
of Algeria, Libya, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela. For this 
somewhat reduced data set, the results of Case E were obtained. It is 
obvious that now a higher coëfficiënt of determination results. More 
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important is that all parameter estimates have the proper sign, and are 
of a magnitude that was to be expected in view of the earlier results. 
Taken together, the findings of these exercises induced the final 
choice of the estimation procedure. As the coefficients of inter-
correlation have shown, the multicollinearity problem centres around 
the population variables. Their parameters have to be determined 
exogenously. Pre-assigned values of -0.15 for c*2 and -0.05 for 04 would 
appear to be in line with information available in the literature as 
well as with estimates obtained in the various cases discussed above. 
Using these values, estimates of the remaining parameters are obtained 
as reported in Table 1 in the column Final estimates. The coëfficiënt 
of determination adjusted for the degrees of f reedom is not 
particularly satisfactory, but the values of the t statistic are at an 
acceptable level. The results given in this column will be used in the 
tariff-lowering simulations discussed in the next section. 
At this stage a further comment regarding the neglected zero flows is 
in place. When the final parameter estimates are used to compute the 
explained or predicted value of Xm£j for all 2301 cells of the trade 
matrix, all empty cells or zero observations are assigned a non-zero 
value, as the gravity equation necêssarily predicts a (perhaps very 
small but always) positive trade flow value. However, many of these 
predicted values are small indeed. The frequency distribution of the 
predicted values of the 608 empty cells is (values in 1,000 US 
dollars): 
value range frequency 
1 - 10 135 
11 - 100 248 
> 100 225 
608 
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Table 1. Estimation results of a gravity-model analysis of bilateral trade in 
manufactured products; 1980 data 
In X?. = a_ + an In V? + a„ In N. + a_ In T? + a. In Y.+ ac In N. + ij 0 1 1 2 i 3 1 4 j 5 j a, In T? + a^ In D.. 6 J 7 ij 
Note: underlined parameter values have been determined exoeenouslv 
Case A Case B Case C Case D Case E Final 
estimates 
a0 5.793 6.430 5.302 5.508 6.192 5.743 
( 6.7) ( 7.6) ( 6.5) ( 6.4) ( 7.4) ( 7.3) 
O! 1.241 1.390 1.242 1.242 1.200 1.226 
(22.2) (39.5) (22.2) (22.2) (22.5) (43.1) 
a2 -0.176 -0.413 . -0.175 -0.175 -0.123 -0.15 
( 2.1) ( 8.8) ( 2.1) ( 2.1) ( 1.6) 
a3 -2.207 
( 3.5) 
-2.218 -2.217 -2.677 -2.371 
( 3.5) ( 3.5) ( 4.4) ( 6.7) 
a4 0.734 0.876 0.87 
(11.5) (17.8) • • -• 
0.87 0.801 0.802 
(13.0) (22.9) 
a5 0.050 -0.165 -0.05 
( 0.6) ( 3.4) 
-0.073 -0.047 -0.05 
( 2.1) ( 0.6) 
a6 -2.157 
( 3.5) 
-1.566 -1.60 
( 4.1) 
•1.902 -1.531 
( 3.2) ( 4.0) 
*7 -1.643 -1.646 -1.646 -1.644 •1.660 •1.631 
(18.9) (19.0) (19.0) (19.0) (19.7) (19.0) 
Rz 0.590 0.585 0.551 0.552 0 .632 0 .609 
Note: Figures in brackets are t-statistics. 
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As these figures show, 63 percent of these predicted values are in the 
value range up to US $ 100,000 - an amount that could well be the value 
of an individual consignment of manufactures. For such small amounts it 
is hardly possible to speak of a 'normal' level of trade on an annual 
basis; when figures are not averaged over a number of years, relatively 
large year-to-year variations are likely to occur, even down to a level 
of zero trade in any particular year. Furthermore, it has to be noted 
that there are sometimes particular reasons why a trade flow appears as 
zero in the data set: political reasons (e.g. China-Korea Rep. reported 
zero, predicted US $ 230 min), straightforward errors (e.g. 
Netherlands-Bangladesh reported zero, predicted US $ 4.8 min), and 
deliberate non-reporting (e.g. the well-known case of Indonesia-
Singapore reported zero, predicted US $ 73 min). In such cases it would 
be erroneous to consider the zero values as true observations to be 
included in the estimation. For these reasons it is by no means certain 
that the non-inclusion of the zero flows in het estimation procedure 
has introduced an upward bias in the predictions of the smaller flows 
that is significant. 
•Lastly it has to be noted that even if the smallest trade flows would 
be overestimated somewhat when using the parameters of Table 1, this 
would hardly affect the overall öutcóme of the simulation exercises to 
be discussed in the next section. The reason for this is that these 
small flows carry little weight in the results, as the effects of 
tariff-lowering are simulated proportionately (i.e. trade-flow 
weighted). The predicted values of the 608 empty cells add up to a 
total of only US $ 548 million, which is 0.485% of the total value of 
the (2301) predicted flows. So in f act any upward bias induced by 
overestimating these values must be considered negligible. 
It may be concluded from the above that the parameter estimates of 
Table 1 (Final estimates) are well-suited to describe the general 
structure of the trade-flow network of the 1980 data set. As is 
immediately clear from the value of the coëfficiënt of determination 
(0.61 only), large deviations of actual from predicted trade flow 
magnitudes do occur. However, there is no reason to expect a particular 
bias to exist in the matrix of explained or predicted flows - apart 
from the possibility of a slight overestimation of the smallest flows. 
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The estimated general structure will be used in the simulations now to 
be described. 
4-. The effects of lower tariff levels on the volume of trade 
Tariff reductions for South-South trade in manufactures, as envisaged 
in the context of a GSTP , may be aimed at according to a great variety 
of tariff-cutting formulas. One of the simplest approaches is that of 
an across-the-board, linear reduction of all tariffs by a certain 
percentage. This simple and straightforward approach is the example 
that will be used in this section to assess the magnitude of the 
potential trade-stimulating effects of preferential tariff margins for 
LDG manufactures on LDC import markts. In the trade-flow simulations 
discussed below, the effects of two levels of preferential treatment 
will be analysed: a linear tariff reduction for imports originating 
from LDCs by 20 percent, and a linear tariff reduction by 50 percent. 
Establishment of a preferential trading arrangement between LDCs may 
affect the magnitude of most, if not all, trade flows in the world. If 
we distinguish two groups of countries, the DCs and the LDCs, the 
possible effects of the introduction of a GSTP among the LDCs are those 
shown in the below scheme: 
^"~*\v^^ to 
exports from"--^^ 
LDCs DCs 
LDCs 1) increase (strongly) 2) decrease (possibly) 
DCs 3) decrease (moderately) 4) increase (possibly 
and marginally). 
Bikker (1982), who introduced this scheme, argues that the effects 
referred to in the second column are erroneously neglected in 
conventional trade theory but might well occur in actual fact; e.g. 
contraints at the supply side of LDCs might lead to a certain 
redirection of exports (box 2 in the scheme) from DC to LDC 
destinations once the latter become easier accessible. In our study, 
the effects described in the second column are assumed to be 
nonexistent, however; as the very purpose of a GSTP for manufactures is 
to stimulate the growth of manufacturing output in the South, it is 
assumed that existing export outlets to the DCs will not be damaged by 
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increasing export possibilities elsewhere (to other LDCs). 
Thus limiting the analysis to the two effects in the first column, it 
has to be determined (a) by how much LDC exports to other LDCs will 
increase as a consequence of a tariff cut for intra-LDC trade, and (b) 
by how much LDC imports from DCs will decrease because part of the DC 
supplies will be replaced by LDC supplies. The first effect, 
corresponding with box 1 in the scheme, is usually called the gross 
trade creation; the second effect (box 3) is the trade diversion. The 
difference between the two is the net trade creation. 
Gross trade creation is calculated using the gravity equation estimated 
in the preceding section. It is assumed that the gravity equation, in 
spite of its weak theoretical foundation and its essentially static and 
descriptive character, captures quite satisfactorily the principal 
structural factors that shape the quantitative pattern of world trade 
flows. •*• Lowering the value of the explanatory variable representing the 
tariff level, for the intra-LDC trade flows, will show - ceteris 
paribus - the new and increased magnitudes of intra-LDC trade, and 
hence gross trade creation. 
In its Standard specifrcation usedr here, thé gravity equation does not 
allow for any substitution effects that may occur. Hence, it cannot be 
used to estimate the extent of trade diversion. It is possible, 
however, to determine the maximum amount of trade diversion that could 
occur when all structural parameters of the gravity equation are kept 
constant except the scale parameter aQ (which is adapted downwards). 
This procedure implies that the enlarged total imports (i.e. af ter 
preferential tariff cuts) of an LDC are scaled down, proportionally for 
all countries of origin, to the original (pre-tariff-cut) total import 
level. In other words, per importing LDC the value of aQ is reduced by 
the reciproke of post-tariff-cut imports over pre-tariff-cut imports 
according to the gravity equation. Thus, net trade creation is made to 
be zero, and the lowering of tariffs only results in a partial switch 
Cross-section regressions for fairly long series of successive years 
have shown a great stability in the parameter estimates obtained; 
see e.g. Aitken (1973), Sapir (1981) and Van Maanen (1988). 
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from DC suppliers to LDC suppliers. 
The implication of all this is that the present approach only yields an 
upper and a lower bound for the trade flow consequences of a GSTP 
tariff cut. As exporters, LDCs stand to gain most if gross trade 
creation equals net trade creation and no trade diversion occurs; the 
lower supply price on the domestic market of the importers leads to 
increased demand for the LDC export products, that do not compete with 
DC supplies. LDC exporters gain the least if trade diversion is at its 
maximum and net trade creation nil; LDC and DC supplies are substitutes 
for each other and the price advantage of the LDC-supplied products 
gives LDC exporters a larger share in the constant import total. In 
reality, the actual situation is likely to be an in-between case: some 
products supplied by LDCs wil.1 primarily compete with domestic products 
produced in the importing èountries, and other products will compete 
primarily with existing DC supplies. 
In our comparative-staties exercise, we will first determine the 
effects of a lowering of the value of Tm, the import tariffs as a trade 
impediment at the demand side. The relevant term in the gravity 
equation is 
r
 t. i - 1-531 
.
 1+
 wj 
with t^ - average ad valorem import tariff of country i as a 
percentage. Obviously, the effect of a proportional tariff cut will be 
the larger, the higher the initial value of t^. The table below shows 
the elasticity £ of the trade-flow value with respect to the tariff 
level, for different values of t^. 
H * 
100 - 0 .77 
80 - 0 .68 
60 - 0 .57 
40 - 0 .44 
20 - 0 .26 
10 - 0 .14 
5 - 0 .07 
1 - 0 .02 
For the countries in the sample, the highest average tariff levels are 
those for Pakistan (81.1), Bangladesh (80.1) and India (73.0), and the 
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lowest are those for Hong Kong and Singapore (both 0.5). Thus, the 
linear tariff cuts studied here will have the strongest effects on the 
imports of the three first-mentioned countries, while the imports of 
the latter two will hardly be affected. 
The results of the simulations with a 20 percent and a 50 percent 
tariff cut (Tm) are shown in Table 2 per importing country and in Table 
3 per export ing country. Columns (1) and (3) show the effects on LDC 
trade if it is assumed that no trade diversion occures, and columns (2) 
and (4) report the simulated changes in case of maximum trade 
diversion. The last column of Table 2 lists the initial tariff levels 
of the individual countries. 
The numerical findings given in Table 2 require little further comment. 
The magnitude of the percentage-wise import increases can easily be 
understood, given the initial tariff level (column 5), the assumed 
tariff cut, and the 'elasticities' £ mentioned above. It is somewhat 
surprising that the differences between the columns (1) and (2) are so 
small, and similarly those between the columns (3) and (4). The reason 
is that the LDC imports of manufactures still come overwhelmingly from 
the industrialized countries; therefore, an increase in the (small) 
part originating in other LDCs^  raises total imports very little, so 
that a scaling down to the original total requires a modest reduction 
only. (It has to be noted, however, that the differences concerned 
should have been somewhat larger; for the countries in the sample the 
actual share of DCs in the LDC imports of manufactures was 87 percent, 
but the simulations on which Table 2 is based imply a DC share as high 
as 93 percent). 
For the 39 countries of the South included in the sample, total 
(simulated) imports of manufactures of Southern origin increase by 5.8 
percent for a mutual tariff preference of 20 percent, and by 16.0 
percent for a mutual tariff preference of 50 percent, in case of trade 
creation only. When a maximum of trade diversion is assumed, these 
overall increases are 5.1 and 13.9 percent, respectively. (For the 
reason given in the above paragraph, these percentages have an upward 
bias). 
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Table 3 summarizes the same results per exporting country. The 
numerical findings understandably differ much less now between the 
individual countries, and remain closer to the overall percentage 
changes just mentioned. Proximity to large import markets with high 
initial tariff levels makes an LDC exporter gain more than average 
trade expansion (Cyprus, Bangladesh); closeness to trade partners with 
an already very low protection level reduces the export gains from a 
linear tariff reduction (Kuwait's closeness to Saudi Arabia; Malaysia's 
closeness to Singapore). In the case of maximum trade diversion 
(columns 2 and 4), the DCs in the sample see their exports to the South 
reduced by, on average, 0.4 percent (20 percent tariff cut) and 1.0 
percent (50 percent tariff cut); again, geographical location vis-a-vis 
the changing import markets introduces some variation in the outcomes 
per country. 
thus far, the analysis has focused on the consequences of a lowering of 
the import tariffs Tm that constitutè a barrier for foreign supplies 
seeking to enter the LDC domestic markets. As discussed in section 2 
already, this is but one role that is played by tariffs in an 
explanation of foreign trade levels. There is another effect that has 
to be taken into account as well: high tariffs not only curtail 
imports, but at the same time •redace"thë" export öfieritation of 
production. In the gravity equation this tendency was introduced in the 
form of the variable Te, i.e. the (import) tariff level as an 
explanatory variable at the export side. In due time, a lowering of the 
tariff level will lead to a stronger world-market orientation of the 
manufacturing sector and to a larger export share of manufacturing 
production. This medium- to long-term effect may be simulated by 
reducing, in the gravity equation as estimated before, the value of the 
variable Te. 
Again the simulations concern two levels of tariff reduction, by 20 and 
by 50 percent, respectively. Obviously, in these cases the tariffs in 
their import-curtailing function (Tm) are lowered as well, and by the 
same percentage. As the latter are lowered for intra-South trade only, 
the export-expanding effect of a lower Te is also assumed to apply to 
export flows to Southern countries only. Thus, in their trade contacts 
with DCs the LDCs remain relatively 'closed' economies (i.e. with 
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Table 2. Trade-increasing effect of a tariff cut for manufactures originating 
from the South, in percentages of imports of manufactures from the 
South, per importing country; short-term effect only 
tariff pre ference 20% tariff pre ference 50% initial 
no maximum no maximum tariff 
importing trade trade trade trade level 
country diversion diversion diversion diversion in % 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Algeria 
Libya 
Morocco 
Sudan 
Tunisia 
Egypt 
Cameroon 
Centr. Afr. Rep. 
Congo 
Gabon 
Ethiopia 
Kenya 
Liberia 
Mauritius 
Niger 
Somalia 
Togo 
Tanzania 
Argentina 
Brazü 
Colombia 
Mexico 
Paraguay 
Venezuela 
Jamaica 
Cyprus 
Kuwait 
Saudi Arabia 
Bangladesh 
Sri Lanka 
Hong Kong 
India 
Indonesia 
Korea Rep. 
Malaysia 
Pakistan 
Philippines 
Singapore 
Thailand 
6. 
4. 
12. 
11. 
7. 
12. 
8. 
8. 
6. 
4. 
8. 
10. 
7. 
10, 
4. 
8. 
3, 
5, 
6, 
8. 
8 
6 
3. 
5. 
5.7 
5.3 
0.8 
0.8 
15. 
9. 
0. 
14. 
8. 
8. 
4. 
15, 
6. 
4. 
12. 
10. 
7. 
11. 
7. 
8.0 
6.4 
3. 
7. 
9. 
6. 
9. 
4. 
7. 
3. 
5. 
5. 
7. 
7. 
6. 
1. 
5. 
9 
,9 
,5 
,9 
,2 
,6 
,8 
,6 
.4 
,4 
,4 
,8 
,4 
.9 
,3 
5.2 
4.9 
0.7 
0.7 
8.0 
0.2 
8.3 
13. 
8. 
0. 
13. 
6. 
8. 
3, 
13. 
7. 
0. 
17.8 
11.6 
36 
33 
20 
36 
16. 
23. 
23, 
15, 
15, 
22.8 
24.0 
18.7 
11.0 
23.3 
29 
19 
28 
13 
23 
10 
15 
17.8 
8.5 
14.3 
2.0 
2.0 
47. 
27. 
0. 
43. 
22. 
23. 
12. 
47, 
22, 
7.1 
0.4 
23.0 
17.6 25.5 
11.3 16.1 
35.1 57.2 
31.5 52.5 
20.0 29.7 
34.8 58.3 
21.1 33.5 
22.1 35.5 
17.2 26.8 
10.2 15.1 
21.9 34.3 
26.7 45.0 
18.7 28.8 
25.9 44.0 
12.2 18.3 
21.5 34.9 
9.4 13.8 
14.5 22.5 
14.4 24.1 
20.2 34.5 
21.5 34.7 
17.2 25.4 
4.9 11.6 
14.0 21.1 
13.8 21.5 
13.0 20.0 
1.6 2.6 
1.8 2.6 
38.8 80.1 
23.6 41.2 
0.4 0.5 
38.9 73.0 
18.0 32.9 
22.7 34.4 
7.7 16.8 
41.3 81.1 
19.2 32.3 
0.3 0.5 
19.4 33.8 
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Table 3. Trade-increasing effect of a tariff cut for manufactures originating 
from the South, in percentages of exports of manufactures to the 
South, per exporting country; short-term effect only 
tariff preference 20% tariff preference 50% 
no maximum no maximum 
trade trade trade trade 
diversion diversion diversion diversion 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Algeria 7.0 6.7 19.7 18.7 
Libya 7.4 7.1 20.7 19.7 
Morocco 6.4 . 6.2 17.7 16.8 
Sudan 6.4 6.0 18.3 16.7 
Tunisia 5.8 5.6 15.9 15.3 
Egypt 6.0 5.6 16.5 15.3 
Cameroon 5.9 5.4 16.3 14.8 
Centr. Afr. Rep. 6.7 6.1 18.6 16.7 
Congo 6.6 6.0 18.2 16.4 
Gabon 7.2 6.7 20.1 18.3 
Ethiopia 6.5 6.0 18.6 16.9 
Kenya 6.3 5.7 17.8 15.9 
Liberia 6.9 6.3 19.1 17.4 
Mauritius 6.7 6.0 19.2 16.9 
Niger 6.8 6.2 18.8 17.0 
Somalia. 6.8 6.2 19.5 17.4 
Togo 6.8 6.3 19.0 17.2 
Tanzania 7.4 6.7 21.2 19.0 
Argentina 7.2 6.3 19.9 17.2 
Brazil 6.0 5.3 16.4 14.4 
Colombia 6.1 5.7 16.7 • 15.5 
Mexico 6.6 6.0 18.2 16.5 
Paraguay 7.4 6.5 20.5 17.8 
Venezuela 7.2 6.7 19.8 18.2 
Jamaica 6.3 6.0 17.3 16.1 
Cyprus 8.3 7.9 23.7 22.4 
Kuwait 2.3 2.1 6.6 5.9 
Saudi Arabia 3.7 3.3 10.6 9.3 
Syria 7.1 6.6 19.9 18.6 
Bangladesh 8.4 7.5 24.5 21.5 
Sri Lanka 7.3 6.5 21.1 18.4 
Hong Kong 7.2 6.4 20.1 17.6 
India 5.1 4.5 14.6 12.6 
Indonesia 4.4 3.7 12.4 10.3 
Korea Rep. 5.1 4.5 14.4 12.4 
Malaysia 3.0 2.6 8.5 7.1 
Pakistan 5.8 5.3 16.9 15.0 
Philippines 4.2 3.7 11.8 10.2 
Singapore 5.8 4.4 15.8 11.8 
Thailand 5.3 4.5 
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14.7 12.4 
exporting 
country 
Table 3, contxnued 
non-South countries (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Canada - 0.5 - 1.3 
United States - 0.4 - 1.2 
Japan - 0.5 - 1.3 
China - 0.5 - 1.3 
Belgium-Lux. - 0.4 - 1.1 
Denmark - 0.4 - 1.1 
France - 0.3 - 0.7 
Germany, Fed. Rep. - 0.4 - 1.1 
Ireland - 0.4 - 1.0 
Italy - 0.2 - 0.6 
Netherlands - 0.4 - 1.1 
United Kingdom - 0.4 - 1.1 
Austria - 0.4 - 1.0 
Portugal - 0.3 - 0.7 
Sweden - 0.4 - 1.2 
Switzerland - 0.3 - 0.9 
Spain • - 0.2 - 0.6 
Poland - 0.4 - 1.2 
Australia - 0.7 - 1.8 
New Zealand - 0.6 - 1.7 
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'both' tariffs Te and T m at their initial level), but in their mutual 
trade contacts the LDC economies become more 'open' as importers and 
exporters. 
Tables 4 and 5 list the results obtained, per importing and per 
exporting country, respectively. Comparison with the tables 2 and 3 
shows at once that the magnitudes of the changes are much greater: not 
only is the export-side effect added to the import-side effect, but the 
former is also stronger than the latter as the absolute value of 0:3 is 
larger than that of og. 
Because all changes in the trade flows are computed according to the 
'standard pattern' of the gravity equation, the largest increases in 
both imports and exports are predicted again for countries with the 
highest initial tariff levels. Thus, in case of LDC tariff preferences 
of 50 percent the imports of Bangladesh and of Pakistan would take 
twice their original level (Table 4, column 3), and percentage-wise 
their exports would grow even stronger (Table 5, column 3). The trade 
flows that are least affected are those of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Hong 
Kong, Singapore' and Malaysia. Assuming maximum trade diversion, the DCs 
would see their exports of manufactures to LDCs reduced by, on average, 
2.8 percent. 
To round off this presentation of the empirical results, a note of 
warning is called for. The country results as given in Tables 2-5, 
though indicative of the order of magnitude and of the relative impact 
of increased mutual trade on different LDC countries, cannot be 
interpreted as accurate forecasts of the actual impact of a 20 percent 
or 50 percent GSTP arrangement. Apart from the estimation problems 
already discussed in section 3, and the just middle-range value of the 
coëfficiënt of determination, the level of commodity aggregation ('all 
trade in manufactures') is too high to warrant firm statements at the 
country level. The results for all (sample) countries of the South 
taken together have greater reliability and deserve more attention than 
the country findings. They are brought together in Table 6. 
As this and the preceding tables show, the issue of trade creation 
versus trade diversion cannot be settled in the approach foliowed in 
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Table 4. Trade-increasing effect of a tariff cut for manufactures originating 
from the South, in percentages of imports of manufactures from the 
South, per importing country; long-term effect 
tariff pre ference 20% tariff pre ference 50% 
no maximum no maximum 
importing trade trade trade trade 
country diversion diversion diversion diversion 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Algeria 
Libya 
Morocco 
Sudan 
Tunisia 
Egypt 
Gameroon 
Centr. Afr. Rep. 
Congo 
Gabon 
Ethiopia 
Kenya 
Liberia 
Mauritius 
Niger 
Somalia 
Togo 
Tanzania 
19.6 
16.8 
24 
24 
19 
23 
20 
20 
18 
16.0 
20.6 
22 
19 
22 
16 
20 
15 
19. 
16. 
24. 
22. 
18. 
22. 
18. 
19. 
17. 
14.8 
18.0 
19. 
20. 
18. 
20. 
15. 
19. 
14. 
16. 
60 
50 
78 
78 
58 
75 
61 
63 
56 
47 
64 
70.8 
58.9 
70 
49 
66 
45 
55 
59 
48 
76 
72 
56 
70 
55 
57 
50 
42 
59 
62 
54 
61 
45 
58 
41.8 
48.5 
Argentina 
Brazil 
Colombia 
Mexico 
Paraguay 
Venezuela 
Jamaica 
19. 
19. 
19. 
18. 
14. 
17. 
16. 
16, 
16. 
17. 
17, 
8. 
16. 
14.8 
58.8 
57.4 
58.2 
53.8 
43.2 
51.6 
48.0 
47. 
47. 
52. 
51, 
21, 
47, 
42.3 
Cyprus 
Kuwait 
Saudi Arabia 
18.3 
6.1 
12.0 
16.6 
5.0 
11.0 
55.9 
17.9 
36.3 
49.4 
14.3 
32.6 
Bangladesh 
Sri Lanka 
Hong Kong 
India 
Indonesia 
Korea Rep. 
Malaysia 
Pakistan 
Philippines 
S ingapore 
Thailand 
.5 
.0 
.6 
29.8 
22.2 
11. 
24. 
14. 
16.0 
7.8 
28.7 
13.8 
8.7 
16.0 
25 
19 
10 
21 
11.8 
15.6 
5 
25 
12 
5 
13 
.1 
.2 
.5 
.7 
103. 
71. 
33. 
78. 
43. 
48, 
22. 
98, 
41, 
24 
48 
80. 
58. 
29.8 
68.0 
33. 
46. 
13. 
82. 
35, 
15, 
39.6 
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Table 5. Trade-increasing effect of a tariff cut for manufactures originating 
from the South, in percentages of exports of manufactures to the 
South, per exporting country; long-term effect 
tariff preference 20% tariff preference 50% 
no maximum no maximum 
exporting trade trade trade trade 
country diversion diversion diversion diversion 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Algeria 18.1 17.2 54.3 50.9 
Libya 14.8 14.0 43.1 40.1 
Morocco 27.3 26.4 89.5 85.5 
Sudan 26.1 24.6 85.2 78.5 
Tunisia 18.3 17.7 54.6 52.3 
Egypt 27.0 25.8 88.8 83.1 
Cameroon 19.7 18.1 59.8 53.7 
Centr. Afr. Rep. 21.2 19.4 65.4 58.4 
Congo 18.0 16.4 54.0 47.7 
Gabon 14.2 12.7 41.1 35.4 
Ethiopia 20.6 19.1 64.0 57.7 
Kenya 23.7 22.0 75.6 68.0 
Liberia 19.1 17.5 57.8 51.5 
Mauritius 24.0 22.0 76.6 68.3 
Niger 15.0 13.4 43.8 37.9 
Somalia 21.1 19.4 65.9 58.6 
Togo 13.2 11.7 38.0 32.5 
Tanzania 17.4 15.6 52.3 45.3 
Argentina 17.7 15.1 52.7 43.3 
Brazil 20.1 17.5 61.2 51.6 
Colombia 20.3 19.1 61.8 56.9 
Mexico 17.6 16.0 52.2 46.3 
Paraguay 12.9 10.5 36.8 28.4 
Venezuela 16.6 15.2 48.7 43.6 
Jamaica 15.8 14.7 46.1 41.8 
Cyprus 17.3 16.3 52.1 48.0 
Kuwait 3.6 2.5 9.9 6.3 
Saudi Arabia 4.9 3.6 14.0 9.6 
Syria 15.3 14.1 45.0 40.5 
Bangladesh 35.2 32.8 126.0 114.1 
Sri Lanka 23.7 21.6 76.0 67.1 
Hong Kong 7.5 5.8 20.9 15.4 
India 29.5 27.5 100.9 91.4 
Indonesia 17.8 15.4 53.7 45.0 
Korea Rep. 19.1 17.2 58.2 51.2 
Malaysia 10.4 7.7 29.5 21.0 
Pakistan 32.2 30.4 113.2 104.2 
Philippines 17.4 15.7 52.3 45.9 
Singapore 6.0 3.6 16.5 9.1 
Thailand 19.0 16.8 
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58.0 49.6 
Table 5 continued 
non-South countries (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Canada - 1.2 - 3.5 
United States - 1.1 - 3.2 
Japan - 1.1 - 3.2 
China - 1.2 - 3.6 
Belgium-Lux. - 1.0 - 3.0 
Denmark - 1.1 - 3.2 
France - 0.7 - 2.1 
Germany, Fed. Rep. 
- 1.0 - 3.0 
Ireland - 1.0 - 2.9 
Italy - 0.6 - 1.8 
Netherlands - 1.0 - 3.0 
United Kingdom - 1.0 - 2.9 
Austria - 1.0 - 2.9 
Portugal - 0.7 - 2.0 
Sweden • - '1.1 - 3.2 
Switzerland - 0.9 - 2.6 
Spain - 0.6 - 1.8 
Poland - 1.1 - 3.3 
Australia - 1.6 - 4.6 
New Zealand - 1.5 - 4.4 
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this paper, and only the 'extreme cases' can be computed. Moreover, the 
figures for the case of maximum trade divers ion are biased, as was 
indicated above: the gravity model yields a lower explained LDC share 
in trade in manufactures than the observed share, and hence the 
magnitude of the diversion of DC trade is underestimated. Using the 
observed (rather than the explained) trade shares in the imports of the 
individual countries, and combining these with the unchanged estimates 
of gross trade creation, the last column of Table 6 would have to show 
the percentages 12.7 an 35.4 for the LDC sample countries, and -1.8 and 
-4.5 for the DC sample countries. In point of f act, the last two 
figures for the DCs may still be too low; at the exporting side, DCs 
are overrepresented in the sample as compared to LDCs, thus reducing 
the relative impact of trade diversion. 
Table 6. Trade-increasing effect of a tariff cut for manufactures 
originating from the South; weighted average in percentages 
no maximum no maximum 
trade trade trade trade 
diversion diversion diversion diversion 
short-term effect Tm 20% lower Tm 50% lower 
sample LDCs 5.8 5.1 16.0 13.9 
sample DCs - 0.4 - 1.0 
long-term effect Tm and Te 20% lower Tm and Te 50% lower 
sample LDCs 15.1 13.1 45.7 38.4 
sample DCs - 1.0 - 2.8 
As neither the case of no trade diversion nor that of maximum diversion 
is likely to be a realistic one, an in-between result should actually 
be expected. The overall quantitative conclusion of the analysis might 
thus be formulated as follows. For the present sample of countries, and 
using the methodology of this paper, a GSTP tariff preference for 
manufactured products of 20 percent is expected to lead to a South-
South trade expansion of some 5.5 (short term) to 14 (long term) 
percent, and a tariff preference of 50 percent to a South-South trade 
expansion of 15 (short term) to 42 (long term) percent of the level of 
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intra-South trade in manufactures. 
This overall result may be compared with the findings of Erzan, Laird 
and Yeats (1986) reported in the UNCTAD Discussion Paper No. 16. These 
authors used a partial equilibrium projection model to analyse the 
effects of a linear tariff reduction on the mutual trade of 23 major 
LDCs at the SITC four-digit level. For total South-South trade they 
found, assuming a 50 percent tariff cut, an expansion of mutual trade 
of 8.5 percent (of which just over one-fourth would be due to trade 
diversion). For manufactured products only (defined as SITC 5 to 8), 
assuming the same tariff cut and infinitely elastic supply, the 
projected trade expansion is nearly 39 percent - a figure close to our 
long-term estimate of 42 percent. Comparison of the country results is 
not possible, as the country figures are reported only for total 
trade. •*-
5. Summary and conclusions 
Using a gravity model with import tariff levels as one of the 
explanatory variables both at the import side (as a demand-reducing 
factor) and at the export side (as a proxy- for the degree of domestic-
market orientation of manufacturing production), bilateral trade in 
manufactures is analyzed for a sample of 60 DC and LDC exporters and 39 
LDC importers. Estimates of the trade-reducing impact of tariffs are 
obtained, and these parameters are subsequently used to simulate the 
trade expansion that would result from a lowering of the initial tariff 
levels. In this analysis, tariff levels are assumed to be 
representative for the level and impact of all TCMs combined. 
The lowering of the tariffs applies only to imports of manufactures 
originating from other LDCs, thus simulating the consequences for trade 
of a Global System of Trade Preferences (GSTP) among developing 
countries. In assessing these consequences, two stages are 
Langhammer (1987), in a study of the effects of preferential 
tariff reductions among LDCs for nine individual countries, also 
deals with all trade, rather than trade in manufactures. 
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distinguished: the short-term or demand-side effects resulting from 
lower import tariffs as such, and the long-term effects which comprise 
in addition the supply-side effects of a stronger export orientation of 
the manufacturing sector. 
In the simulation exercise, a crucial assumption is that the estimated 
parameter values of the gravity equation remain unchanged. The 
assumption of unchanging structural coefficients also allows an 
assessment of the maximum of trade diversion that might occur as a 
consequence of a GSTP; however, whether or not - or rather to what 
extent - trade diversion will occur cannot be established in this 
approach. 
The numerical results obtained are summarized in Table 6 above. For the 
present sample of countries it is found that 
(a) the short-term effects of a GSTP lowering of import tariffs for 
manufactures are relatively modest only, a 20 percent linear 
tariff cut leading to an expansion of trade in manufactures 
between the LDCs of 5.5 percent, and a substantial tariff cut of 
50 percent leading to a trade expansion of 15 percent. 
(b) the long-term effects of a GSTP lowering of import tariffs for 
manufactures are eonsiderably 1 arger than the shortr-"ternr effects, 
with expected increases in intra-LDC trade in manufactures of 14 
percent (20 percent tariff cut) and 42 percent (50 percent tariff 
cut), respectively. 
(c) the extent to which trade diversion from DC suppliers to LDC 
suppliers would occur affects the expected LDC trade .increases 
rather moderately only; in case of a 50 percent tariff cut the 
long-term LDC trade expansion ranges from 46 percent (no trade 
diversion) to 38 percent (maximum trade diversion). 
(d) even the long-term effects of a 50 percent GSTP tariff cut with a 
maximum of trade diversion from DCs to LDCs would imply a lowering 
of DC exports of manufactures to LDC markets by 3 percent only. 
For reasons discussed earlier at some length, the numerical findings 
should not be interpreted as highly accurate forecasts but rather as 
being indicative of the likely order of magnitude. This is necessarily 
so when the country coverage in the sample is taken into account: many 
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developing countries and centrally-planned economies could not be 
included. Apart from this factor, however, it has to be recognized that 
also the statistical base on which the numerical outcomes rest is not 
such as to warrant very precise quantitative predictions. 
In terms of GSTP policy making, two conclusions stand out. The first is 
that the cumbersome and time-consuming process of negotiating the 
details of a GSTP implementation will only pay off if the eventual 
lowering of tariffs and non-tariff TCMs will be substantial; a lowering 
of trade barriers by, say, 10 or 20 percent will have a very limited 
trade-expanding effect only.1 The second conclusion is that the long-
term effects of lower TCMs (which encompass a re-orientation of the 
manufacturing sector towards exporting to GSTP member-countries) are 
much more important than the immediate effects of easier access to LDC 
import markets, even though they will obviously take longer to 
materialize. 
The passible consequences of a more rapid expansion of LDC exports of 
manufactures for the rate of growth of GNP are not dealt with here, and 
the same is true for other implications for the national economies of 
the countries concerned. These 'dynamic' consequences are often stated 
to be the .most important—ones-r--ïo--the- extent that such 'dynamic' 
effects are part and parcel of a less inward-oriented industrialization 
policy in LDCs, the present analysis yields some support to this view. 
For all trade, Langhammer (1987) reaches a similar conclusion. 
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